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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff bank claims it 
loaned money to the Defendants F. Leland Seely and 
T. Seely, his wife, and that the plaintiff is en-
titled to be repaid. The Defendant F. Leland Seely claims 
that pursuant to a request by officers and directors of 
the vlaintiff bank, he did accomodate the plaintiff bank, 
itt-> officers and directors, by signing a promissory note 
fnr which he received no consideration. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The 
!lrf<>nclants made motion in open court for leave to amend 
thPir answer on file. Plaintiff's motion for summary 
.ittflgmcmt was based npon the pleadings, exhibits, affi-
2 
davits, and counter-affidavits on file. The Court d<•niPd 
defendants' motion for to amPncl their answer and 
granted plaintiffs rnotion for summary jndgrnent 111 
the Defendant F. Ll•land fScely and denied plaintiff', 
motion for snmmary judgment as to the Dd<,nclant GracP 
T. Seely. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Supreme 1Court reverse the decision of th1· 
lower court by setting aside the summary judgment and 
remand to allow the defendant to amend his answer, and 
for trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the first day of May, 19G5, defendant 
was contacted by James Jamieson, an officer and direct-
or of the plaintiff bank. Jamieson explained that as an 
officer and director of the Bank of Commerce, he conld 
not obtain a loan from the plaintiff hank as others could. 
Jamieson stated that he wonkl make arrangc•ments for n 
loan in the name of the dcfc•nclant, bnt that it would at-
tnally be tJw loan of James Jamieson. He told the dr-
fendant that this rJl'ocedurn was accPptahle with tl1l' 
plaintiff hank and assured tlw clt>fendant this was tlll' 
·way that din_•dor loans were handled. The ddcndant 
agreed to accornmodak James JamiPson and tlw plain 
tiff hank, and \rn:-; no ii fied 1\l r. Jmuil·son in early :Ma:. 
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111C1, 11iat tlH' n0cessary annI'gPrnents ltad been made 
,,illt tlw plaintiff hank and th0 dc•fcndant could go to the 
!1ank at his conveniPnce. On May 10, 19G5, the defendant 
,,,,,nl to the plaintiff hank in 1\fagna, Utah, with his son 
\:ll'll ::\I. Seely. At the bank, defendant was introduced 
tn a man \Yho was identified as C. R. Canfield. Mr. Can-
fir•l<l n•quested that defendant sign a promissory note 
for $:2:l,000 and endorse a clwck of the same amount which 
]11) licul on his dc•sk. Upon signing the note and endorsing 
th d1<·ek, J\ir. Canfield retained both check and promis-
note. No instrnctions wne given by the defendant 
io ?If r. Canfield or to any other party concerning the 
1li,;1im1ition of the funds. No payments were made on the 
prnmissory note by the defendant. On November 29, 
1 '.Jfi:l, tlw ddenclant, to again accomodate James Jamieson 
i!l1d the plaintiff bank, signed a second promissory note 
snrn<• amount, which was marked "renewal". No pay-
lll('nh w<>rn made on this note by the defendant, and on 
,\foy 20, 1966, the defendant once again accomodated 
.l l1Jrws J arnieson and the plaintiff bank by signing a third 
prumissory note which was marked "renewal" and which 
1.•i l1•d1•cl a rrdnction in principal of $5,000. The fore-
;'.oi11,1>.; transactions and additional renewals occurred over 
a iwriod of about fonr years . .Tames Jamieson, as an of-
i'ic1·r nnu dirrdor, tC'rminated his association with the 
jil<i inti f'f hank ancl no\\· tlt0 plaintiff bank, although an 
a1·rommodatcd pnriy, looks to the defendant for the 
kdance of the irnlehteclnPss. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE 
SEELY CASE BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRE-
SENTED. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE 
SEELY CASE BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRE-
SENTED. 
Swnnwry Jiidgment, Ride 56, is a carefnlly limited 
procedural device to be employed only when there are no 
affidavits in good faith, evidence, or inferences which, 
when viewed i11 the light most favorable to the losing 
party raise any issue of material fact upon ·which relid 
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r:m lw granted. Brandt vs. Springville Banking Co., 10 
['t. 353 P.2d 4GO (1960); Bullock vs. Desert Dodge 
Tr11cl.: Cr11tcr, Inc., 11 Ut. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); 
Tm1wT 'cs. Utah Poitltry & Farmers Co-op, 11 Ut. 2d 353, 
:3:J9 P. 2J 18 (19GO). For the very reason that summary 
jnclg1m·nt prevents litigants from fully presenting their 
rase_ to the court, courts should be reluctant to invoke 
this remedy. 
Ddendants in the Seely case pleaded affirmative 
cll•h·nses and submitted affidavits to the court in factual 
snpvort of their defense. Reduced to its essentials, the 
flefonse is that there "\Yas no consideration for the con-
lrart <'Xl'cuted between the parties, and that the plaintiff 
holder of the promissory note based thereon is not a 
holder in due course entitled to be free of that defense. 
(f;ve. 4-t-1-59, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Indeed, as to 
rern·wals, note the parallel statutory provisions in the 
Fniforrn Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-306: 
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due 
course any person takes the instrument subject to 
(a) All valid claims to it on the part of any 
person; and 
(b) all def ens es of any party which would be 
available in an action on a simple con-
tract; and 
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( c) the defenses of want or failure of con 
sideration, non1wrformance of any c·o11 
dition precedent, nondelivery, or cleliYen 
for a special Jlnrpose ( 70A-:j_ 
408); 
The plaintiff bank is no transferee holder at all, but an 
original party to the agreement. Further, Section 70A-
3-408 of the Utah Code, adopted in 19G6, merely codified 
the existing law on this point when it stat0s: "vVant or 
failure of consideration is a defense as agaiust any per-
son not having the rights of a holder in due course ... '' 
In no sense is the plaintiff bank a "holder in due 
course" entitled to be free of this defense. Section 70A-
3-302 of our Utah Code clearly requires, among other 1 
things, that the instrument be taken for value, in goud 
faith, and "·without notice ... of any defense against or 
claim to it on the part of any person". The bank would 
he charged with the knowledge of its agent-executive 
officer, and by its own course of dealing which defend-
ants were prepared to show. Section 70A-3-304 is explicit: 
t·ven a purchaser for value has "notice of a claim against 
the instrument -wh0n he has knowledge that a fiduciarY 
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as 
cnrity for his O\Yn ckht or in any transaction for his mrn 
benefit or othenvise in bn-'aeh of dnty". 
As reflected hy tlw pkaclings of plaintiff, the affi-
davit of C. R Canfo,ld, and by tli<' pleadings and conntPl-
affidavits of ])p['<>rnlant F. Lvlancl f-Jeely, the facts are in 
direct omim;itiou. 
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The hank's representations as to the facts are: 
1. Defendant F. Leland Seely applied for a loan. 
2. Defendant F. Leland seely signed the original 
pl'Omissory note of May 10, 1965, and a series of renewal 
notes. 
3. Defendant F. Leland Seely received the money 
and gave instructions for its disbursement. 
rrhe contentions of the Defendant F. Leland Seely 
an': 
1. James Jamieson, an officer and director of the 
plaintff hank applied and arranged for the loan and as-
the defendant this was the ·way that officer and 
di n'etor loans were handled by the plaintiff bank. 
2. Defendant F. Leland Seely states that he signed 
the> original promissory note dated May 10, 1965, and the 
::(•fi('S of renewal notes as a third party to accomodate 
the plaintiff bank and director James Jamieson, and that, 
furthPr, the bank through its officers knew of the ar-
rnug<'ments and, in fact, received and accepted payments 
on the note from Jamieson. 
3. Defendant F. Leland Seely states that he received 
no money and gave no instruction as to disbursement and 
8 
that said moni('S WPl'C' rc>tf'inncl J·i'.T l\I (' R ' 1 f"" ] ' -« _, ' • · r. '· · . '-an H' 11. 
Vice PresidPnt of thl' plaintiff liank. 
Conmwl for d<'l'Pndant-appellant, argm•d at th 
hearing that the foregoing facts are disputed and tl1a1 
there does exist between the plaintiff bank and defendant 
a bona fide dis1mt<c> of material fact. (Pages 9-11, Tran 
script of Procc'0dings). This Court since its decision in 
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Ut. 2d 251, 351 P.2d G24 (1960), lrns 
uniformly held that if is an uncontroverted affi. 
davit and there is no dis1rnte of a material fact, then tl11· 
court may grant a summary judgnwnt, but if there is <I 
counter-affidavit or if there are mat0rial facts in dispnl1" 
then to grant a judgment would he reversibl1· 1 
error. See also Larsen vs. Christensen, 21 Ut. 2d 219, 220, 
443 P.2d 402 (19GS); Fox vs. AUstate Insurance Com-
pany, Ut. 2d P.2d (1969). 
D<·fendant-aJlp0llant and l\fr. Olen l\I. Seely fil1•d 
eounter-affidm'its and sd ont facts that were not only 
a mere denial of t11e plaintiff's contentions that the <le-
f endant aprlJ:ecl for tlw loan, received the money alld 
gave instructions for its clishnrnc'ments, hut also ha> 
raised mntcrinl of fact m; to defendant's contenti011 
that the plaintiff ancl its agr'nt JnnH•s Jamieson were t]JI' 
parties accomo<1at<>tl and tliat thP iiiaintiff has on pn'-
Yions occasion m;<·d this sc11enw and proccdnrc for mak-
ing· hank orfiec•r ;ind di rPdor loans. 
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rt also appears the lmver court was convinced that 
rnaterial issues of fact were raised as on Page 1 of the 
Transcript of ProcePdings, the Court states: 
From reading the affidavit of the Seelvs and 
this bank officer, the two parties haven't diamet-
rically met the issues on the question of considera-
tion, as I recall it. That's why I spoke out at the 
beginning, because the Defendant Leland Seely 
indicates in his affidavit that he went to the bank 
to accommodate Jamieson and the bank. He 
doesn't say he went in there to accommodate his 
son-in-law, which the bank officer said he went in 
there for, so right off the bat the·re is an issue of 
fact apparently, unless you can explain it away. 
c\ml on Page 2 of the Transcript, the Court states: 
Well, I'll put it to you this way. Either you 
produce them or I will grant the motion sum-
marily. All right, get them down here. There are 
some omissions that need to be amplified, and I'm 
shooting from the hip. I may have to take all of 
this back. 
Counsel for the defendant-appellant could not reach 
ancl produce the defendants for questioning at that time. 
TJ1r> ddendants Wtc're not subpoenaed and had no notice 
tli1·y would he requested to appear. It appears the court 
l1a;; shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the 
d1·fonuant in the matter of the summary judgment. How-
1·1 f'l', if you accept the defendant's version of the facts, 
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plaintiff "-onlcl lw (·11titl('d to jrn1p;m1·nt, 1wcausr ""'u; 
accommodation party is not liahl<' to an acc01mnodat1·d 
party, rcgardl<·ss of tlH·ir appatT11t n•la',:on upon th1· 
Jla1wr." (11 A_m .Tnr :2d Pap:<·;.; ()0!)-(i10) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND 
HIS ANSWER. 
Rule lG(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stafr, 
that leave to a party to amend his pleading shall he 
given when jnstice so rPqnires. 
This is a case whc•re tlw motion for summary jnclg 
ment was filed 30 days after the filing of the complain! 
.l'fo adequate• time g1v<'n for int<'rrogatori<·s or clPpo:i-
tions. Parti«s to these tnu1sadions w(_•re sea tkn•il 
throngl10nt Nation in Ne"- York, Airzona, California 
and Uh1.1i. Prior to th(_• ti11w for hearing the motion for 
snnnnary :judg111Pnt, defendant wm; dC'nied time to fnlh 
discover the information rn·cPssary to proh•ct his in-
tC'rests a11cl pro1wrt:-- wh<•n snC'h i11fon11a.tion was pn-
in ol' plaintiff. 
Connsd for tlie <kfrnclnHt at Ow hc'aring mntk 
motion to tlit> lower <·m:rt for l<'HV(' to amend clcfendant'o 
answ0r. (Pnrngn1ph 1 of Pa,e>:<' 11, 'l'ran;;cript of Prnccr1l 
11 
ing;-;.) '!'his motion was made for the reason as counsel 
<llglwd that since the time of filing defendant's answer, 
lw had been made a·ware of at least three other occasions 
the plaintiff has given loans in the name of a 
third party for the purpose of accommodating the plain-
tiff and its officers and directors. In these transactions, 
loans were paid by the accomodated officers and di-
n•etors of the plaintiff (Pages 9-10, Transcript of Pro-
u,rclings) . 
Tn the third paragraph of defendant's counter-affi-
dayi.t, the defendant makes mention of this scheme used 
1 h>· the plaintiff and states that James Jamieson, the 
plaintiff's officer and director, assured him that this was 
tlie way these types of officer and director loans were 
handled. These facts are also stated in the third para-
graph of the counter-affidavit of Mr. Glen M. Seely. 
Certainly, the foregoing facts raised are material, 
and give rise to an affirmative defense which the defend-
ant has the right to assert. If plaintiff's version of the 
fads are shown in a trial on the merits then certainly the 
plaintiff in this matter before the court is the accom-
1no<lakd party and under the law would be estopped 
from asserting its claim against the defendant. 11 Am. 
-l 11r. 2d, pages 599, G09, and 610. 
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The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of 
the lower court by setting aside the summary 
and remand to allow the defendant to amend his answer, 
and for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TURNER & F AIRBOURN 
GERALD L. TURNER 
Valley Professional Plaza 
2525 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage 
prepaid, to Rendell N. Mabey, Attorney for Bani 
of Commerce, the Plaintiff and Respondent, at 
1700 University Club Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, on the 7 of August, 1969. 
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Gerald L. Turner j 
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